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Learning to Look at the Bright Side of
Life: Attention Bias Modification
Training Enhances Optimism Bias
Laura Kress* and Tatjana Aue
Department of Psychology, University of Bern, Bern, Switzerland
Identifying neurocognitive mechanisms underlying optimism bias is essential to
understand its benefits for well-being and mental health. The combined cognitive
biases hypothesis suggests that biases (e.g., in expectancies and attention) interact
and mutually enforce each other. Whereas, in line with this hypothesis, optimistic
expectancies have been shown to guide attention to positive information, reverse causal
effects have not been investigated yet. Revealing such bidirectional optimism-attention
interactions both on a behavioral and neural level could explain how cognitive biases
contribute to a self-sustaining upward spiral of positivity. In this behavioral study, we
hypothesized that extensive training to direct attention to positive information enhances
optimism bias. To test this hypothesis, for 2 weeks, 149 participants underwent either
daily online 80-trial attention bias modification training (ABMT) toward accepting faces
and away from rejecting faces or neutral control training. Participants in the ABMT
group were instructed to click as quickly as possible on the accepting face among
15 rejecting faces randomly displayed on a 4-by-4 matrix; participants in the control
group were instructed to click on the five-petaled flower depicted among 15 seven-
petaled flowers. Comparative optimism bias and state optimism were measured
via questionnaires before training, after one training week, and after two training
weeks. ABMT enhanced comparative optimism bias, whereas control training did not.
Our findings reveal that ABMT toward positive social information causally influences
comparative optimism bias and may, thereby trigger the biases’ benefits for well-being
and mental health. These results can (a) stimulate future neurophysiological research in
the area of positive psychology; and (b) reveal an innovative low-cost and easy-to-access
intervention that may support psychotherapy in times of rising numbers of patients with
psychological disorders.
Keywords: attention bias modification training, cognitive bias modification, comparative optimism bias,
expectancy bias, positive attention bias
INTRODUCTION
People are usually overly optimistic about their future (optimism bias; Weinstein, 1980) and
preferably attend to positive information around them (attention bias; Pool et al., 2016). Both
behaviors relate to benefits in everyday life (maintaining motivation) and clinical domains
(protecting mental health; Joormann and Gotlib, 2007; Sharot, 2011). However, we know little
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about how optimism and attention bias interact (Kress and
Aue, 2017). If we knew that the positivity biases mutually
enforced each other (bidirectional interplay), instigating a
self-perpetuating upward spiral of positive emotions (Garland
et al., 2010), we could more easily employ the biases’ benefits in
everyday life and clinical applications.
Theories such as the combined cognitive biases hypothesis
suggest that cognitive biases (e.g., in expectancies and attention)
interact and mutually enforce each other (Hirsch et al., 2006;
Aue and Okon-Singer, 2015; Kress and Aue, 2017). From the
combined cognitive biases hypothesis, we have recently proposed
that optimism bias and positive attention bias dynamically
interact and recruit a common underlying neural network.
This network may comprise specific activations in the anterior
and posterior cingulate cortices with functional connections
to the limbic system (e.g., amygdala; see Kress and Aue,
2017, for further details). Furthermore, we proposed potential
mechanisms of neural communication that might support
the bidirectional interplay between optimism and positive
attention bias.
Some of these theoretical considerations are supported by first
empirical findings showing that optimistic expectancies indeed
guide visual attention toward rewarding information (Kress et al.,
2018). Large-scale neural networks comprising fronto-parietal
brain regions in addition to the insula seem to underlie this
mechanism (Kress et al., under revision). Notably, however, if
bidirectional optimism-attention interactions exist, the reverse
causal influence (and, later on, its underlying neural processes)
must be demonstrated as well (Kress and Aue, 2017).
Attention bias modification training (ABMT: repeated
training to attend to specific target stimuli and ignore others)
may help investigators to study such causal influences of
attention on optimism because it promises to modify attention
(bias) and affect emotions (MacLeod and Mathews, 2012).
Recent neural evidence suggests that ABMT reduces amygdala
and insula activation toward emotional (threatening) stimuli
(Månsson et al., 2013; Taylor et al., 2014). Furthermore,
ABMT has been shown to increase frontal control and may
thereby reduce anxiety symptoms (Browning et al., 2010; Taylor
et al., 2014). Even though these results are promising, recent
meta-analyses have revealed several methodological challenges
related to ABMT (e.g., Cristea et al., 2015; Heeren et al., 2015b;
Grafton et al., 2017; see Jones and Sharpe, 2017, for an overview).
Most studies in these meta-analyses used threat-avoidance
ABMT to reduce pre-existing attention biases to threat in
anxiety. Yet, these pre-existing biases are not consistently shown
and can therefore not be modified in some ABMT studies
(Mogg et al., 2017).
From the controversies concerning the appropriateness of
threat-avoidance ABMT, a novel approach (positive-search
ABMT) has been considered more promising in eliciting
beneficial emotional outcomes: Positive-search ABMT works
more reliably in home settings and elicits emotional benefits
without exclusively relying on changes in attention bias (Mogg
et al., 2017). Furthermore, the process trained in positive-search
ABMT (i.e., finding a positive stimulus among negative stimuli)
may be more adaptive and transferrable to real-life situations
than processes trained in traditional threat-avoidance ABMT
(e.g., reacting to a dot appearing after a neutral stimulus).
For instance, the particular positive-search ABMT used in the
current behavioral study has been developed to improve people’s
ability to inhibit social rejection and approach social acceptance
information by training them to find the smiling face in a crowd
of frowning faces (Dandeneau and Baldwin, 2004). This training
to direct attention to adaptive information may be most effective
to boost optimism bias.
People’s attention was biased away from negative and
toward positive social information after completing positive-
search ABMT in most (Dandeneau and Baldwin, 2004, 2009;
Dandeneau et al., 2007; Waters et al., 2013; De Voogd et al., 2014,
2016) but not all (Waters et al., 2015) studies assessing attentional
changes following training. More important, positive-search
ABMT elicited diverse beneficial emotional outcomes (lower
perceived stress, enhanced self-esteem/positive self-regulation:
Dandeneau et al., 2007; Dandeneau and Baldwin, 2009; reduced
anxiety/social phobia: Waters et al., 2013, 2015, 2016; De Voogd
et al., 2014; but see De Voogd et al., 2016, for null findings).
These beneficial outcomes, in turn, are also associated with
optimism bias for positive future events (e.g., self-esteem and
self-regulation; Hoorens, 1996; Armor and Taylor, 1998). Thus,
positive-search ABMT constitutes a promising tool to examine
the effects of positive attention processes on optimism bias.
For two reasons, we decided to focus on optimism bias
for positive future events in the current study, both relating
to evidence in the literature that optimism biases for positive
and negative future events represent different aspects with
independent motivating factors (Weinstein, 1980; Hoorens,
1996). First, self-enhancement has been suggested to be an
important motivating factor for optimism bias for positive future
events but not for optimism bias for negative future events
(which may be related to different motivating factors such as
impression management; Hoorens, 1996). The positive-search
ABMT used in the current study has been developed to enhance
positive social cognition and self-regulation, thereby permitting
the examination of cognitive mechanisms of self-enhancing
positivity. Second, the positive-search ABMT used here has
shown to enhance self-esteem (Dandeneau et al., 2007;
Dandeneau and Baldwin, 2009). Because higher self-esteem was
particularly associated with elevated optimism bias for positive
future events but less so with optimism bias for negative future
events (Hoorens, 1996), we hypothesized that the positive-search
ABMT may be particularly effective in enhancing optimism bias
for positive events.
The present work investigates whether repeatedly directing
attention toward positive or away from negative social
information during training causally influences optimism
bias. Participants were randomly assigned to ABMT or control
training. Before training, after one training week, and after two
training weeks, all participants completed the Comparative
Optimism Scale (COS; Weinstein, 1980; measuring optimism
bias via social comparison) and the Future Expectancy Scale
(FEX; Peters et al., 2015; measuring current optimistic states
that are not necessarily biased but likely instigate optimism
bias; see Garland et al., 2010, for details on how momentary
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emotional experiences trigger durable changes in emotional
systems/affective styles). Because optimistic states vary across
situations, ABMT that directs attention to positive aspects of a
situation may trigger such state optimism.
Whereas comparative optimism bias was measured to
uncover the importance of social/self-enhancing components in
relation to attention processes, state optimism was measured
to examine whether attention processes elicit optimistic states
that then instigate the biases’ formation. By measuring these
different aspects, the current study can uncover crucial
determining factors for the influence of attention processes on
optimism bias (social comparisons and/or transient optimistic
states). If repeatedly directing attention to positive information
through training enhances optimism bias, then people’s level
of comparative optimism bias and/or state optimism should
increase after participating in positive-search ABMT but not after
the control training.
Even though prior literature proposes that ABMT affects
people’s responses to emotional and motivational cues (Beard
et al., 2012)—such as when forming expectations about positive,
motivationally salient future events—ABMT does not seem to
directly affect people’s mood (Dandeneau and Baldwin, 2004;
Dandeneau et al., 2007; Beard et al., 2012). To replicate this
finding and rule out the possibility that potential training
effects on optimism bias arose because of changes in mood, we
assessed participants’ mood with the Positive and Negative Affect
Schedule (PANAS; Watson et al., 1988) as a secondary outcome
in the current study.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
From a recent systematic review of meta-analyses on the efficacy
of ABMT on emotional outcomes, we anticipated a small effect
of ABMT on optimism bias (Jones and Sharpe, 2017; because
effect sizes varied considerably, we chose the most modest
assumption of a small effect). A minimum sample size of 128 to
detect such small effect (η2p = 0.02) was determined with a
power analysis (α = 0.05, power = 0.95). Because we expected
high dropout rates over the two training weeks, 20 additional
participants were tested. Thus, 149 healthy participants with
normal or corrected-to-normal vision, who did not report
using psychoactive substances, took part in this online study.
Sixteen participants were excluded from data analysis because
of technical errors in data logging (N = 2), or because they
did not complete the training on more than 2 days (N = 14),
leaving a final sample of 133 participants (experimental group:
N = 71, 26 male, age: MExp = 22.17 years, SDExp = 3.92 years;
control group: N = 62, 16 male, age: MCon = 23.35 years,
SDCon = 3.16 years). Participants were randomly assigned to
a group and did not show baseline differences in any of
the reported outcome measures (i.e., optimism or mood; all
ps ≥ 0.283). However, the experimental group displayed slightly
lower trait optimism scores than the control group did (i.e., Life
Orientation Test-Revised (LOT-R) sum scores; Scheier et al.,
1994: t(131) = - 0.920, p = 0.057,MExp = 22.61, SDExp = 3.89, and
MCon = 23.89, SDCon = 3.78). Participants gave written informed
consent according to the guidelines of the ethical standards of
the Declaration of Helsinki and were told that they could end
the experiment at any time. All procedures were approved by
the ethical review board of the Faculty of Human Sciences at the
University of Bern.
Attention Training Tasks
Stimuli in the experimental training task (ABMT) comprised
colored photographs of a smiling/accepting and a frowning face
of 16 different people (half female) that were taken from a
larger stimulus set collected at Mark Baldwin’s ‘‘Social Cognition
and Social Intelligence Lab’’ at McGill University. Stimuli were
presented on a 4-by-4 matrix that appeared in the top middle
of the participants’ computer screen. Each matrix displayed one
accepting face (target stimulus) and 15 frowning faces (distractor
stimuli; see Figure 1)1. Participants were instructed to click as
quickly as possible with their computer mouse on the accepting
face. Stimuli appeared at a random location within the matrix
in each of the 80 training trials. Every trial was presented until
the participant had clicked on the target and the next trial
followed (no inter-trial interval). Difficulty of the training task
did not adapt to participants’ performance and participants did
not receive feedback on their performance during the task.
Stimuli in the control task comprised black and white
drawings of five- and seven-petaled flowers. The procedure in
the control task was identical to that of the experimental task,
except that each matrix displayed one five-petaled and 15 seven-
petaled flowers and participants were instructed to click on
the five-petaled flower as quickly as possible. Thus, the task
controlled for activity of engaging in a visual search (while not
directing attention toward smiling or away from frowning faces).
Procedure
Participants were told that the study’s purpose was to
investigate training to improve responsiveness. For 2 weeks,
they performed daily 5-min online training on their computer
and indicated whether they had performed the training
completely, partly, or not at all on an online questionnaire.
Moreover, participants completed personality questionnaires
(see Supplementary Appendix A) before, 1 week after, and
2 weeks after training began (to prevent suggestibility effects,
participants were not informed about different training versions
or that effects on optimism were being investigated). Participants
received a daily e-mail message containing links to their
version of the training and questionnaires. If participants had
not answered the questionnaires by that evening, they were
reminded. After the last training, participants were debriefed.
Dependent Variables
Primary Outcome (Optimism Regarding Future
Positive Events)
On the COS (Weinstein, 1980), participants indicated the
likelihood of themselves, compared to another person of the
1The attention bias modification training and control training used
in the current study can be accessed via the following links: ABMT-
http://baldwinlab.mcgill.ca/labmaterials/materials_16fa_c_80.html; Control
training- http://baldwinlab.mcgill.ca/labmaterials/materials_16fl_80.html
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FIGURE 1 | Schematic sequence of the experimental procedure. At baseline, all participants completed the Comparative Optimism Scale (COS; Weinstein, 1980)
and Future Expectancy Scale (FEX; Peters et al., 2015) as optimism bias measures (primary outcome), the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson
et al., 1988) as a mood measure (secondary outcome), and the Life Orientation Test-Revised (LOT-R; Scheier et al., 1994). For the following 14 days, participants
completed daily 80-trial attention bias modification training (ABMT) or control attention training. During ABMT, participants were instructed to click as quickly as
possible on the smiling face (here circled in red) among 15 frowning faces in a 4-by-4 matrix; during control training, participants were instructed to click as quickly as
possible on the 5-petaled flower (here circled in red) among 15 7-petaled flowers (based on Dandeneau and Baldwin, 2004). On day 7, all participants completed the
optimism bias/mood measures, the Behavioral Inhibition System/Behavioral Activation System Scales (BIS/BAS; Carver and White, 1994) and the 10-Item Big Five
Inventory (BFI-10; Rammstedt, 2007). On day 14, all participants completed the optimism bias/mood measures, the Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ; Gross
and John, 2003), and the Satisfaction with Life Scale (SWLS; Diener et al., 1985). BIS/BAS, BFI-10, ERQ, and SWLS have been conducted for a larger project on
individual differences associated with optimism bias.
same age and gender, to experience 18 positive (e.g., ‘‘Marrying
someone wealthy’’) and 23 negative future life events (e.g.,
‘‘Having a heart attack’’) on a scale ranging from -3 (much less
likely) to 3 (much more likely)2. On the FEX (Peters et al., 2015),
measuring state optimism, participants indicated the likelihood
of experiencing 10 positive (e.g., ‘‘You will get a lot of satisfaction
out of life’’) and 10 negative future events (e.g., ‘‘You will have
health problems’’) on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (‘‘not
at all likely to occur’’) to 7 (‘‘very likely to occur’’). Sub-scores
representing comparative optimism bias and state optimism
about future positive events were computed by usingmean scores
of participants’ answers to positive items of the COS and FEX.
Reliability was acceptable for the positive subscale of the COS
(Cronbach’s α = 0.71) and good for the positive subscale of the
FEX (Cronbach’s α = 0.85) in the current sample.
Secondary Outcome (Mood)
On the PANAS (Watson et al., 1988), participants indicated
how strongly they experienced 10 positive (e.g., ‘‘excited’’)
and 10 negative feelings (e.g., ‘‘distressed’’) at the moment
on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (‘‘not at all’’) to 5 (‘‘very
much’’). Sub-scores representing positive and negative mood
were computed by using sum scores of participants’ answers to
positive and negative items of the PANAS. In the current sample,
2The German in-house translation of the COS (Weinstein, 1980) used in the
current study can be found in Supplementary Appendix B.
reliability was good for both the positive (Cronbach’s α = 0.85)
and the negative subscale of the PANAS (Cronbach’s α = 0.81).
Exploratory Outcomes (Optimism Regarding Future
Negative Events)
Additionally, sub-scores representing comparative optimism bias
and state optimism about future negative events were computed
by using mean scores of participants’ answers to negative items
of the COS and FEX for an exploratory analysis. Reliability was
good for the negative subscale of the COS (Cronbach’s α = 0.88)
and acceptable for the negative subscale of the FEX (Cronbach’s
α = 0.78) in the current sample.
Data Analysis
Primary Outcome (Optimism Regarding Future
Positive Events)
We hypothesized that performing positive-search ABMT
increases comparative optimism bias and state optimism for
future positive events, whereas performing neutral control
training does not. We performed two 3 × 2 analyses of
variance (ANOVAs) with the within-subject factor time
(baseline, one training week, two training weeks) and the
between-subject factor group (experimental, control) on positive
sub-scores of COS (Weinstein, 1980) and FEX (Peters et al.,
2015). Support for our hypothesis should be reflected in
significant time × group interactions. To ensure that potential
effects on comparative optimism bias and state optimism
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cannot be explained by group differences in trait optimism,
participants’ trait optimism scores were included as a covariate
in the analyses.
Secondary Outcome (Mood)
We also performed two 3 × 2 ANOVAs with the within-subject
factor time (baseline, one training week, two training weeks)
and the between-subject factor group (experimental, control) on
positive and negative sub-scores of the PANAS (Watson et al.,
1988). However, we did not hypothesize, in consistency with
earlier findings, an effect of either the positive-search ABMT or
the neutral control training on positive or negative mood.
Exploratory Outcomes (Optimism Regarding Future
Negative Events)
We further explored whether performing the positive-search
ABMT or the neutral control task influenced comparative
optimism bias and state optimism regarding future negative
events. In this context, we also wanted to test the degree to which
effects observed for positive events are comparable to those
observed for negative events (for both optimism bias and state
optimism). Therefore, we performed two 3 × 2 × 2 ANOVAs
with the within-subject factors time (baseline, one training
week, two training weeks) and valence (future positive events,
future negative events) and the between-subject factor group
(experimental, control). Participants’ trait optimism scores
were included as a covariate in the analyses. We additionally
performed two 3 × 2 ANOVAs with the within-subject factor
time (baseline, one training week, two training weeks) and the
between-subject factor group (experimental, control) on negative
sub-scores of COS (Weinstein, 1980) and FEX (Peters et al.,
2015). Again, participants’ trait optimism scores were included
as a covariate in the analyses.
Significant interactions were further investigated by post hoc
(Sidak corrected) pairwise comparisons. An α-level of 0.05 (two-
tailed) was applied to all analyses. Reported effect sizes are partial
eta-squared and noted as η2p. If the sphericity assumption was
violated, Greenhouse-Geisser corrected values are reported.
RESULTS
Training Adherence
On average3, participants completed 13 of 14 training sessions
and training adherence did not differ between the experimental
and control groups (t(145) = 0.770, p = 0.442, MExp = 13.05,
SDExp = 2.41, and MCon = 12.76, SDCon = 2.22). Of the
147 participants who initially enrolled in the study and had no
technical errors during data collection, 81 (55.1%) completed
all 14 training sessions, 38 (25.9%) completed 13 of 14 training
sessions, 13 (8.8%) completed 12 of 14 training sessions, and one
completed 11 of 14 training sessions and started the other three
training sessions without finishing (totaling the 133 participants
included in the analysis). The remaining 14 participants (9.5%)
completed 1 (N = 2), 2 (N = 2), 4 (N = 1), 8 (N = 1), 9 (N = 1), or
11 (N = 8) of the 14 training sessions.
3The raw data of this study can be found in Supplementary Appendix C.
Primary Outcome (Optimism Regarding
Future Positive Events)
Comparative optimism bias regarding future positive events
did not generally differ between groups, F(1,130) = 1.119,
p = 0.292, η2p = 0.009, or change over time, when we controlled
for variations in trait optimism, F(2,227) = 0.295, p = 0.714,
η2p = 0.002. Notably, the predicted time × group interaction
was significant when we controlled for variations in trait
optimism, F(2,227) = 4.339, p = 0.018, η2p = 0.032. In line with
our hypothesis, comparative optimism bias regarding future
positive events increased from before to after two training
weeks and showed a trend to increase from before to after
one training week and from after one to after two training
weeks when people performed daily ABMT (baseline vs. two
training weeks: p = 0.001, baseline vs. one training week:
p = 0.070, one training week vs. two training weeks: p = 0.066,
as revealed by post hoc pairwise comparisons). Comparative
optimism bias regarding future positive events did not change
when people performed neutral control training (baseline vs.
two training weeks: p = 1.000, baseline vs. one training week:
p = 0.976, one training week vs. two training weeks: p = 0.958;
see Figure 2A).
By contrast, state optimism regarding future positive
events did not differ between groups, main effect of group,
FIGURE 2 | Change in comparative optimism bias and state optimism from
baseline to after two training weeks in the experimental/control group. Error
bars depict standard errors. (A) Comparative optimism bias significantly
increases over the 2-week training period in the experimental group but does
not change in the control group when we control for trait optimism. (B) State
optimism does not differ between groups or change over time when we
control for trait optimism.
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FIGURE 3 | Change in positive and negative mood from baseline to after
two training weeks in the experimental/control group. Error bars depict
standard errors. (A) Positive mood does not change over the 2-week training
period in the experimental or control group. (B) Negative mood does not
change over the 2-week training period in the experimental or control group.
F(1,130) = 0.218, p = 0.641, η2p = 0.002; time × group interaction,
F(2,226) = 0.758, p = 0.453, η2p = 0.006, or change over time when
we controlled for variations in trait optimism, F(2,226) = 0.482,
p = 0.591, η2p = 0.004 (Figure 2B).
Secondary Outcome (Mood)
Positive mood did not differ between groups, main effect of
group, F(1,131) = 0.095, p = 0.759, η2p = 0.001; time × group
interaction, F(2,262) = 0.671, p = 0.512, η2p = 0.005, or change over
time, F(2,262) = 0.418, p = 0.659, η2p = 0.003 (Figure 3A). Similarly,
negative mood did not differ between groups, main effect of
group, F(1,131) = 0.377, p = 0.540, η2p = 0.003; time × group
interaction, F(2,232) = 0.313, p = 0.705, η2p = 0.002, or change over
time, F(2,232) = 2.423, p = 0.091, η2p = 0.018 (Figure 3B).
Exploratory Outcomes (Optimism
Regarding Future Negative Events)
An exploratory analysis revealed that when valence was added as
an additional factor in the analysis, there was only a marginally
significant time × valence × group interaction, F(2,220) = 2.903,
p = 0.066, η2p = 0.022, regarding comparative optimism bias
for future events when we controlled for variations in trait
optimism. Furthermore, comparative optimism bias regarding
future negative events did not differ between groups, main effect
of group, F(1,130) = 0.2.326, p = 0.130, η2p = 0.018; time × group
interaction, F(2,222) = 0.023, p = 0.964, η2p = 0.000, or change over
time, F(2,222) = 0.040, p = 0.961, η2p = 0.000, when we controlled
for variations in trait optimism.
There was no significant time× valence× group interaction,
F(2,208) = 1.290, p = 0.277, η2p = 0.010, regarding state optimism
regarding future events when we controlled for variations in trait
optimism. State optimism regarding future negative events was
significantly lower in the experimental group than in the control
group when we controlled for trait optimism, main effect of
group F(1,130) = 4.997, p = 0.027, η2p = 0.037. However, there
was no time × group interaction, F(2,225) = 0.674, p = 0.265,
η2p = 0.010, and state optimism regarding future negative events
did not change over time, F(2,225) = 1.062, p = 0.340, η2p = 0.008,
when we controlled for variations in trait optimism.
DISCUSSION
The present experiment demonstrates that repeatedly directing
attention toward smiling faces and away from frowning
faces over 2 weeks enhances comparative optimism bias
for future positive events, whereas performing neutral
control attention training does not (Weinstein, 1980).
Adherence to the online attention training used in the
present study was generally high (about 90% of participants
completed all or the great majority of training sessions).
Furthermore, enhanced optimism bias was specific to future
positive events and could not be attributed to peoples’
mood (i.e., positive and negative feelings did not change
over the training period) or be explained by individual
differences in trait optimism (which was controlled for in
the analyses).
Thus, training a cognitive habit to pay attention to positive
social information not only increases self-esteem and reduces
stress, but also enhances optimism bias, an important protective
factor for mental health (Dandeneau et al., 2007; Sharot, 2011).
What is more, this finding supports the combined cognitive
biases hypothesis and implies that (a) expectancy biases are an
essential part of the hypothesis (despite being rarely considered
in past research; Aue and Okon-Singer, 2015); and (b) cognitive
bias interactions are not only present in psychological disorders,
but also extend to positivity biases in healthy individuals (Kress
and Aue, 2017).
Notably, performing the ABMT does not increase state
optimism, but has specific effects on comparative optimism bias.
There are two possible explanations for this distinction. First,
items of the FEX (Peters et al., 2015) used to measure state
optimism are more general than items of the COS (Weinstein,
1980) and might therefore uncover temporary variations in
dispositional optimism (i.e., a general positive life orientation
that is not necessarily biased, such as the belief that good
things will happen) rather than in optimism bias (i.e., biased
expectancies about the likelihood of specific future life events,
such as being more likely than other people to live past
85 years). Even though dispositional optimism might increase
one’s readiness to display optimism bias, the two phenomena
represent separate concepts (Shepperd et al., 2015).
Second, it is possible that the ABMT used in the current study
specifically influenced self-enhancing aspects of comparative
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 6 July 2019 | Volume 13 | Article 222
Kress and Aue Attention Training Enhances Optimism Bias
optimism bias related to social comparison (Hoorens, 1996).
The ABMT has been shown to increase self-esteem (Dandeneau
and Baldwin, 2004), which plays an important role in social
comparison (Jones and Buckingham, 2005) and may, therefore,
mediate the relation between positive attention processes
and comparative optimism bias. Furthermore, the ABMT’s
social stimuli may have had specific effects on the strong
social component of comparative optimism bias (i.e., social
comparison). A more general ABMT (e.g., using specific words
that do not convey a strong social component) might also
influence state optimism. To draw final conclusions on such
mediating factors, future research should directly examine the
relationship between social and non-social ABMT, different
measures of optimism bias, and self-esteem.
Notably, we found that, in accordance with the postulate
that optimism biases for positive and negative future events
represent different aspects with independent motivating factors
(Weinstein, 1980; Hoorens, 1996), the influence of the ABMT
on comparative optimism was limited to the positive events4.
Our exploratory analyses for the negative events revealed solely
a main effect of group regarding state optimism. However,
because this effect remained stable across the three time points
considered (i.e., existed already before the experiment), the effect
cannot be attributed to the training. It remains to be determined
whether other attention modification procedures (e.g., those
that train the individual to shift attention away from negative
stimuli) are more effective in modifying optimism bias for
negative events.
Furthermore, specific mechanisms driving the behavioral
effect reported in the current study could be revealed by
investigating its underlying neural correlates. Prior investigations
of the neural correlates underlying threat-avoidance ABMT, in
which people train to direct their attention away from negative,
maladaptive information, have shown that ABMT may reduce
activity in limbic brain areas such as the amygdala and insula
(Månsson et al., 2013; Taylor et al., 2014) and enhance frontal
control (Browning et al., 2010; Taylor et al., 2014). In contrast,
positive-search ABMT, in which people train to direct their
attention toward positive, adaptive information, could make
positive social information (i.e., happy faces) more salient and
therefore increase amygdala and insula activity. Because people
usually base their expectancies about the future on information
they currently have at hand, we have previously suggested
that biased attention toward positive environmental information
could strengthen optimism bias and that this process is
supported by specific activations in parietal and cingulate cortices
(Kress and Aue, 2017). By increasing the saliency of positive,
adaptive information, positive-search ABMT could facilitate
bottom-up attentional shifts to similar adaptive information in
people’s environment, and—over time—strengthen optimism
bias regarding the future. Of note, the brain’s saliency network
4Note, however, that there was only a marginally significant three-way interaction
between the factors time, valence of the event, and group in the three-factorial
ANOVA comparing effects for positive vs. negative events; thus the specificity of
the ABMT’s effects on comparative optimism bias for positive future events needs
to be further investigated.
(comprising the insula and the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex)
and the executive control network (especially its more parietal
brain areas) have already been shown to play a crucial
role in the reverse causal effect, namely, when optimistic
expectancies guide attention to positive information (Kress et al.,
under revision).
Three methodological features of this work might limit the
conclusions to be drawn. First, we chose online training in
the current study to make sure the training could be easily
administered on a large scale (which is the eventual purpose
of such cognitive training) and would, therefore, be more
useful in both a clinical and non-clinical setting (Holmes
et al., 2018). Unfortunately, we were not able to monitor
how often participants performed the online training; thus,
information on training adherence was based on participants’
self-report. However, social desirability bias is usually reduced
when questionnaires are self-administered online (Nederhof,
1985) and there is no reason to suspect that social desirability
bias would differ between participants in the experimental
and control conditions. What is more, if study adherence had
been lower than proclaimed by the participants, the observed
differences between the experimental conditions should have
been even larger. Thus, the main finding observed in the
current study (i.e., the influence of the positive ABMT training
on comparative optimism bias) should not be limited by
self-reported adherence data.
Second, the control training used in the current study did
not contain face stimuli (as did the ABMT) and therefore
does not control for exposure to faces (and potential associated
social effects). For better comparison with earlier findings,
we decided to use the same conditions as in prior research
on positive-search ABMT (Dandeneau and Baldwin, 2004,
2009; Dandeneau et al., 2007; De Voogd et al., 2014, 2016).
Of note, Dandeneau et al. (2007) did include an additional
control condition in which participants were asked to look
at a matrix of frowning faces similar to the one used in
the ABMT. Whereas the ABMT did modulate attention to
acceptance/rejection information, pure stimulus exposure did
not, making it unlikely that exposure to face stimuli drove
beneficial effects on optimism bias in the current study. Yet, to
securely rule out this alternative interpretation, future research
could include an additional ‘‘social’’ control condition, in which
participants are exposed to face stimuli but have to search for a
different feature (e.g., the face with brown hair/eyes rather than
the smiling face).
The third potential shortcoming relates to the fact that we
did not assess whether and how ABMT changed attention
processes in the current study (e.g., whether attention bias
or attentional control changed throughout the training).
Because previous research has already shown that the specific
positive-search ABMT used in the current study changes
attention bias (Dandeneau et al., 2007), we focused on the
training’s outcome (i.e., whether extensively training a cognitive
habit to direct attention to positive information enhances
self-reported optimism bias) instead of the exact attentional
mechanisms causing this outcome. Thus, even though it is most
likely that the attentional processes targeted by the training
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instigated changes in optimism bias, we cannot exclude the
possibility that other mechanisms contributed to the reported
training effects.
One such mechanism could be stimulus exposure. As
mentioned above, because the control training used in the
current study did not contain face stimuli, it is possible that
changes in optimism bias caused by the ABMT were partly due
to stimulus exposure to frowning and smiling faces. However,
the ABMT contained an overwhelming majority of frowning
faces (each array consisted of 15 frowning faces and only
one smiling face), which should from a theoretical point of
view reduce rather than increase optimism (Kress and Aue,
2017). Moreover, prior research that used the exact same
training protocol as the current study revealed that effects
on self-reported outcome measures (e.g., self-esteem) are not
merely due to stimulus exposure but instead rely on active
attentional mechanisms (Dandeneau et al., 2007). Yet, it is
crucial that future research replicates the current findings
and additionally includes attention measures to shed light
on the exact mechanisms leading to the training’s effects on
optimism bias.
The specificity of traditional threat-avoidance ABMT in
modifying attention bias and emotional outcomes has been
discussed controversially because (1) control trainings have
often elicited similar changes, and (2) threat-avoidance ABMT
may also affect other aspects of attention such as attentional
control (Heeren et al., 2015a). Following these controversies,
it has been suggested to instead adapt ABMT on the basis
of theoretical considerations and investigate its benefits for
emotional outcomes (Mogg and Bradley, 2018). When such
novel ABMT approaches reliably elicit emotional benefits,
attentional mechanisms potentially underlying these benefits
should be investigated with multiple measures (e.g., for
initial attention orienting, attention maintenance, attention bias
variability, attentional control; see Mogg and Bradley, 2016;
Mogg et al., 2017; Waters et al., 2016). Notably, from a
theoretical perspective, both controlled top-down and automatic
bottom-up attention processes potentially targeted by the
ABMT are relevant for the mutually enforcing optimism-
attention interactions that we aimed to investigate (Kress and
Aue, 2017). To draw final conclusions about exactly which
attentional mechanisms cause benefits of positive-search ABMT
on optimism bias, future research needs to investigate (a) how
training affects multiple attentional processes and (b) how
this relates to changes in optimism bias. Such investigation
can then further refine positive-search ABMT to make it
more effective.
Subsequent studies should further include the collection
of performance data to (i) control for potential differences
in training difficulty/performance between the ABMT and
control training and (ii) investigate the influence of different
combinations of individual performance and training types on
optimism in a dose-response manner. Furthermore, comparative
optimism bias could be measured indirectly (i.e., by asking
participants to rate the probability of a positive future event
happening to them and happening to another person separately)
to reveal additional information on whether the ABMT training
increased ratings for themselves and/or decreased ratings for the
average other. The specific assessment of comparative optimism
in the current study did not permit such conclusions because
participants rated their personal likelihood of encountering
positive future events related to the likelihood of the average
person of the same gender and age.
In general, the present findings contribute to a more nuanced
view on the cognitive processes underlying optimism bias. A
cognitive habit to pay attention to positive information is likely
involved in the development and maintenance of optimism bias
and, therefore, reveals how it can be triggered and maintained
(Kress and Aue, 2017).
We have previously shown that optimistic expectancies
strongly guide attention toward reward (Kress et al., 2018) and
hypothesized that subsequent attention to positive information
stabilizes optimism bias. Such supportive attention processes
could explain why future expectancies are selectively updated
into an optimistic (not a pessimistic) direction following
feedback (Sharot, 2011). The current results independently reveal
the crucial missing piece of information corroborating our idea
that attention processes maintain optimism bias over time:
Directing attention to positive information does indeed enhance
optimism bias and can thereby provoke positive feedback
effects on initial optimistic expectancies. Together, these findings
argue for dynamic bidirectional optimism-attention interactions
that maintain positivity and contribute to well-being and
mental health.
Identifying the concrete attentional mechanisms underlying
optimism bias will contribute in an important way to our
understanding of its maintenance over time. Along these lines,
future research should uncover the neural basis underlying
this optimism-attention interplay, thereby supplementing
and informing behavioral investigations. Specifically, the
neurocognitive model proposed to underlie the dynamic
optimism-attention interplay (Kress and Aue, 2017) needs
to be backed up with further empirical neural data. For
instance, it is possible that optimistic expectancies drive ongoing
visual attention toward supporting positive information via
top-down mechanisms initiated in frontal and prefrontal brain
regions (e.g., anterior cingulate cortex, ventromedial prefrontal
cortex/orbitofrontal cortex). At the same time, it is possible
that bottom-up attentional shifts toward positive environmental
information represented in more posterior and parietal brain
regions (e.g., posterior parietal cortex, posterior cingulate cortex)
strengthen optimism about the future (as future expectations are
usually based on information currently at hand).
Examining the neural correlates of positive-search ABMT
influencing optimism bias can thus provide essential information
on which brain regions are activated when shifts in attention
influence optimism and additionally extend the existing
literature on neural mechanisms of ABMT which has, so far,
focused on threat avoidance (Browning et al., 2010; Månsson
et al., 2013; Taylor et al., 2014). Moreover, neuroimaging studies
can identify brain areas involved in dynamic cognitive-bias
interactions and point to the neurotransmitter systems that are
involved. In case an individual manifests malfunctioning or
maladaptive interactions (i.e., in psychological disorders),
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these might then be targeted by specific cognitive and
pharmacological interventions. Studies examining neural
correlates of cognitive-bias interactions may, therefore, reveal
valuable insights for applications in the clinical domain and in
everyday life.
In fact, a central finding in the current study is that
(comparative) optimism bias is malleable and can be easily
modified by adequate attention modification procedures. Thus,
being optimistic can be learned or trained and one is
not deemed to be either high or low on optimism bias.
Moreover, the present findings imply that, in everyday life,
focusing on positive aspects of the environment can boost
optimism, and thereby most certainly motivation, concerning
a difficult task. In the clinical domain, the findings imply
that changing one aspect of biased cognition can alter
other aspects, thereby revealing multiple starting points for
possible modification. The current evidence is hence suggestive
and might improve overall conditions for the prevention
and treatment of psychological disorders. Notably, ABMT
has especially great potential because it can be a low-cost,
standardized, and easy-to-access support for psychotherapy.
Online training that does not require therapist contact
constitutes a first intervention for people with contact anxiety
(e.g., social phobia) and for patients who have to wait months
before seeing a psychotherapist because of an overstrained
health system.
In conclusion, our data show that directing attention toward
positive and away from negative social information enhances
comparative optimism bias. Uncovering such cognitive processes
underlying optimism bias is essential for employing its benefits
for mental health. Positive-search ABMT could trigger a
self-sustaining upward spiral of positivity (through dynamic
optimism-attention interactions), making our findings central
for individual well-being as well as for the prevention and
treatment of psychological disorders (Garland et al., 2010; Kress
and Aue, 2017). In particular, the present findings reveal that
paying attention to positive information around us makes us
more optimistic about our future and they lead to some practical
advice: If we want to look toward a great future, we should start
looking at the good things around us right now.
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